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NORMATIVITY AND BEAUTY IN CONTEMPORARY ARTS
Abstract
Our intuitions related to art are generally associated to ideas such as creativity, free-
dom of expression, experimentation. The fact that so many artists (especially writers, 
but also musicians, painters, performance artists) are or have been people with train-
ing in legal disciplines should be taken into account when considering the apparently 
extrinsic relationship between art and law. The question we have to answer is the fol-
lowing. When we make a judgment of taste looking, say, at the Mona Lisa, what does 
that mean exactly? What do we mean when we say that “the Mona Lisa is beautiful and 
an absolute masterpiece of Western art”? This statement contains a judgment of taste 
(Mona Lisa is beautiful) and an artistic judgment (it is a masterpiece of Western art). 
In what follows I will show that: i) the two judgments are different, ii) both judgments 
have normative nature, but the normativity of the judgment of taste refers to different 
elements from the artistic judgment and, finally, iii) contemporary visual arts require 
the formulation of an artistic judgment rather than a judgment of taste.
1. In the beginning was beauty
Our intuitions related to art are generally associated to ideas such as creativity, 
freedom of expression, experimentation. The fact that so many artists (especially 
writers, but also musicians, painters, performance artists) are or have been people 
with training in legal disciplines should be taken into account when considering 
the apparently extrinsic relationship between art and law. It may be that this is 
just a coincidence, or it may be that art, whatever the definition we decide to 
take, really shares something profound with the law.
On one point, in particular, philosophy can help to solve this issue. We know 
that the history of the liberal arts was deeply intertwined with the history of 
beauty. At least until the beginning of the twentieth century – that is, until Marcel 
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Duchamp presented Fountain at the competition of the Society of Independent 
Artists in 1917 – it was rather obvious that to create a work of art meant to 
create something beautiful. The lemma beautiful was used to synthesize a wide 
range of meanings and nuances of mainly aesthetic nature, which had to do 
with formal and compositional notations, depending on the art form and the 
single cases. Basically, to judge a book as good or a painting as beautiful roughly 
meant to enunciate a judgment of taste related, respectively, to the quality of 
the writing and the narrative contained in the book (it is well written, the story 
works), or with the formal and expressive qualities of the painting. 
Duchamp, as we will see, did two important things: i) he introduced the idea 
that a ready-made, i.e. an artifact of which the artist did not alter any property, 
can be a work of art, and ii) he advanced the hypothesis, as argued explicitly in 
the article entitled The Richard Mutt Case, that works of art can be anesthetic 
and therefore can escape what until then had seemed to be an intrinsic necessity 
of the definition of art – i.e. beauty. Something can be neither “beautiful” nor 
“ugly” and yet still be a work of art1. Mr. Mutt, the pseudonym Duchamp used 
to sign Fountain, had done nothing but choose an object of everyday life, give it 
a title, and present it at an art competition. By doing so Duchamp created a new 
way to look at that object. Between the lines of Duchamp’s gesture we can read 
what later the artist described lucidly and that, to a first approximation, seems 
to rather go in the direction of the gap between art and the law (meaning by 
“law” any form of normativity)2. I will return at length to this point. For now 
I wish to note that before 1917, the date that art history interprets as a break 
from Vasari’s canon, things did not go as they did after Duchamp.
Therefore we can speak of a time before and one after Duchamp. Before Du-
champ, art was deeply tied to beauty. The canons of interpretation organized by 
philosophy to theoretically account for them appropriately referred to sensitivity 
and perception. In this sense, art has to do with the ways in which we perceive 
the world because beauty is perceived primarily through our sense organs. 
Where there is beauty there is sensitivity, and where there is sensitivity there 
is judgment of taste – which, as Immanuel Kant states in the Critique of Judg-
1 I will henceforth use ‘beautiful’ instead of the generic ‘good’ to stress the importance of the 
presence of beauty in the artwork.
2 «There was an incident, in 1912, which ‘gave me a turn,’ so to speak; when I brought the 
‘Nude Descending a Staircase’ to the Indépendants, and they asked me to withdraw it before the 
opening. In the most advanced group of the period, certain people had extraordinary qualms, a 
sort of fear! People like Gleizes, who were, nevertheless, extremely intelligent, found this ‘Nude’ 
wasn’t in the line that they had predicted. Cubism had lasted two or three years, and they already 
had an absolutely clear, dogmatic line on it, foreseeing everything that might happen. I found 
that naively foolish. So, that cooled me off so much that, as a reaction against such behavior 
coming from artists whom I had believed to be free, I got a job». Cabanne: Dialogues with 
Marcel Duchamp, p. 17.
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ment, has an inherently normative structure. Before returning to contemporary 
art to try to understand if indeed Duchamp has ousted any kind of aesthetic 
normativity from artistic production, I will briefly examine the reasons that, in 
the eighteenth century, have led to consider the aesthetic judgment related to 
pre-Duchamp art as intrinsically normative.
2. The universality of beauty
The question we have to answer is the following. When we make a judgment 
of taste looking, say, at the Mona Lisa, what does that mean exactly? What do 
we mean when we say that “the Mona Lisa is beautiful and an absolute mas-
terpiece of Western art”? This statement contains a judgment of taste (Mona 
Lisa is beautiful) and an artistic judgment (it is a masterpiece of Western art). 
In what follows I will show that: i) the two judgments are different, ii) both 
judgments have normative nature, but the normativity of the judgment of taste 
refers to different elements from the artistic judgment and, finally, iii) contem-
porary visual arts require the formulation of an artistic judgment rather than 
a judgment of taste.
According to Immanuel Kant in his Critique of Judgment, particularly where 
he addresses the question of the epistemological status of the judgment of taste, 
by formulating the judgment of taste (Mona Lisa is beautiful) we are arguing 
in favor of the idea that we, who are looking at the Mona Lisa right now at the 
Louvre, like Mona Lisa, and think that it is unquestionably beautiful, whatever 
that means (subjectivity of the aesthetic judgment). At the same time however, 
according to Kant, we expect that anyone who has seen or will see the Mona 
Lisa, can only find it beautiful and, therefore, can only express the exact same 
judgment. It therefore seems that there is a tension between the idea that judg-
ments of taste, i.e. judgments which generally relate to matters subject to taste, 
are subjective (i.e. depend on the subjects that formulate them), and the idea 
that they aspire to achieve broad, even universal, consensus. In other words, 
they seem to be both subjective (individual) and objective (normative). So the 
judgment of taste claims to be normative, i.e. to establish itself as a rule that 
applies to everyone, not just the one who formulates it. 
Before addressing, albeit briefly, the Kantian discourse, it is important to 
explain what I mean when I speak of “normativity”. In these pages I will adopt 
a wide conception, so to speak, of normativity: I will claim that normativity 
corresponds to the awareness that something can be correct or incorrect, but also 
that certain judgments can be better than others. As is well known to scholars, 
in recent years much attention has been devoted to the notion of normativity, 
and this is true both for general philosophy and for its specific areas, primarily 
ethics and epistemology. What should we do? And what should we believe? 
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What is, if there is one, the theoretical core of the metaphysical concept of 
normativity? How, finally, does normativity relate to the judgment?
As much as the relationship between normativity and aesthetic judgment is 
not as immediately obvious as, say, the relationship between normativity and 
ethics, it is also true that, as I anticipated, the subjectivism we often deem con-
nected to the judgment of taste contrasts with an intuition of common sense, 
according to which the judgment of taste requires sharing, or universality. 
This means that judgments of taste regarding properties like beauty or ugliness 
are universal, because they are formulated thanks to (i) dispositions that are 
universally present in the subjects, or because they capture (ii) certain objec-
tive properties of things. In other words, the universality of the judgment of 
taste can be based both on the knowledge of the subject and on the presence 
or absence of certain properties of the things to which the judgment of taste 
refers. In both cases, there is a component of necessity which is related to the 
formulation of the judgments of taste and which constitutes their normativity.
Before Kant, the German philosopher Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten, 
founder of modern aesthetics, established a systematic connection between 
sense perception and aesthetic properties. In one of his most important works, 
Aesthetica, Baumgarten famously defines aesthetics as a science of sensitive 
cognition. It deals with analysing everything that is present to the senses: it is 
the science of sensitive cognition, dealing with the lower degree of cognition. 
Therefore, according to Baumgarten’s definition, aesthetics is the faculty that 
makes use of sensible representations that are indistinct: unclear or confused. 
In this framework, the judgment is the representation of the perfection or 
imperfection of things, and beauty is perfection perceived through the senses 
rather than through the intellect3. 
It is clear that Baumgarten grants this new science a rather wide scope: He 
intends to develop a general science of sensitive cognition rather than a theory of 
the fine arts or the judgment of taste. Therefore Baumgarten divides the theory 
of knowledge into two parts: The first, logic, concerns intellectual knowledge; 
the second, aesthetics, concerns instead the science of sensitive cognition and the 
theory of the liberal arts. The goal of the new science is to achieve the perfec-
tion of sensitive knowledge as such, i.e. beauty, while imperfection as such, i.e. 
ugliness, should be avoided4. Beauty is not, or not only, a property of things, it 
is rather a property that belongs to the workings of our sensitive powers when 
they are organized for the best.
3 This is the definition of aesthetics formulated by Baumgarten in his seminal work: «Aesthetics 
(the theory of the liberal arts, the logic of the lower capacities of cognition [gnoseologia inferior], 
the art of thinking beautifully, the art of the analogon rationis) is the science of sensible cosgni-
tion» (Baumgarten, Aesthethica, § 1).
4 Ivi: § 14.
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In this frame, the question to be asked is this: what is sensitive cognition 
exactly and how does it work? What kind of knowledge does Baumgarten have 
in mind?
The preferred example chosen by Baumgarten is poetry, which is formed by 
ideas that come from the senses. This is the reason why aesthetics, as such, is 
not ratio, that is, it is not an entirely and classically rational science, but rather 
what Baumgarten defines as analogon rationis or facultas cognoscitiva inferior. 
As a form of knowledge, poetry also uses representations that can be more or 
less distinct, and yet it remains a form of knowledge consisting, for the most 
part, of sensitive ideas. On the contrary, scientific knowledge can be composed 
of sensitive ideas, but its standard organization requires the use of representa-
tions. The concept of sensitive idea shows promise for our purposes, especially 
because Baumgarten seems to aspire to a new way of conceiving and organiz-
ing knowledge. In particular, from his point of view it is impossible to draw a 
definite distinction between knowledge derived from the senses and that which 
arises from the intellect: both are necessary, both share the same components, 
albeit in different ratios.
Also, Baumgarten’s outline is rather clear and linear: the lower degree of our 
cognition concerns sense organs, which give us access to the outside world and 
allow us to start the processes of representation of reality. Representations, in 
turn, can grasp external reality in a more or less effective way. In Baumgarten’s 
view, the perception of beauty is intimately linked to the notion of perfection. In 
particular, when he argues that beauty is nothing but the perfection of sensible 
cognition, he is saying that beauty does not belong only to the representation of 
things – to their formal composition, we could say – but also to the experience 
of sensory perception. In other words, there is a potential of beauty that can be 
expressed not only by the form, but also by the content of a work, and this is true 
because the shape of the work may be “beautiful” for our sense faculties – ie to the 
analogon rationis – and its content may be ‘beautiful’ for our theoretical reason. 
From these premises Baumgarten draws some consequences regarding knowl-
edge deriving from the arts: poetry, for example, which like all the fine arts is 
made by our sensitive ideas, can lead to basic knowledge, and therefore have 
access only to the particular. Painting representing the phantasmata of things 
is also similar to poetry. It is interesting to note that wherever you can gain 
knowledge, there must be some form of regularity and thus of normativity. This 
was exactly the consequence that Kant did not fail to derive from Baumgarten’s 
assumptions. Starting from Baumgarten’s reflections, Kant focused his analysis 
on three elements: 1) judgment, and specifically the aesthetic judgment, which 
is both subjective and universal; 2) the concept of beauty, and, finally, 3) the 
concept of normativity.
It is, in fact, the question of Mona Lisa: how come when formulating our 
judgment of taste on the Mona Lisa we expect everyone to agree with us, as 
if we were expressing universal knowledge? Is beauty really, for what concerns 
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epistemology, on the same level as good and truth? Kant believes that the ten-
sion between the freedom of the subject and universal normativity is possible. 
In fact, the subject intimately participates in the formulation of the aesthetic 
judgment, being induced to respond emotionally to the aesthetic perception 
(e.g. feeling pleasure, displeasure or even pain). However, within the judgment 
of taste there is not only the individual response to the aesthetic perception: 
there is also the awareness that the response takes place in a universal form, 
being thus necessarily shared and therefore normative. 
Kant was not particularly interested in art and, in fact, in his perspective, the 
judgment of taste is aesthetic rather than artistic. However, it is certainly true 
that for Kant the place of normativity is beauty, wherever it is given to find it, 
be it in nature or in artistic production. For our purposes it is important to 
clarify Baumgarten’s underlining of the cognitive dimension related to aesthet-
ics, which is, in fact, cognitio sensitiva: in other words, it is the imaginative 
and logical dimension of our knowledge: one in which knowledge remains 
more indeterminate and confused. The arts – and, for Baumgarten, especially 
poetry – allow us to access this area of being, letting us access a less formalized 
dimension of reality that, as such, is marked by its own normativity.
3. Caravaggio’s case
Let’s ask ourselves, concretely, what Baumgarten means. Before doing so, we 
can clarify the reasons for his preference for poetry: provided that the liberal 
arts represent a form of knowledge, albeit inferior to intellectual knowledge, 
Baumgarten prefers art forms in which the semantic element is more obvious 
and structured. So he is particularly inclined to art forms that use words. The 
language of poetry is more “raw” and less logically subtle than scientific language. 
However, precisely because of this lesser subtlety, it captures and signifies an 
important sphere of reality: the obscure zone of our feelings, which we sense, 
but do not discriminate accurately. The visual arts using the narrative style work 
similarly to poetry: the cognitive element is really incorporated and rendered 
through properties of the work that reveal the aesthetic character.
To understand this point, let’s take a classic example of Italian painting: a 
work by Michelangelo da Merisi, better known as Caravaggio. In The Calling 
of St. Matthew (1599-1600), the perception of the formal properties of the 
painting is at least as important as that of the narrative. The narrative content is 
expressed in a more concise, but also more direct way than the narration of the 
same episode as it appears in the Gospel of Mark5. In Caravaggio’s painting the 
5 «Once again Jesus went out beside the lake. A large crowd came to him, and he began to 
teach them. As he walked along, he saw Levi son of Alphaeus sitting at the tax collector’s booth. 
‘Follow me,’ Jesus told him, and Levi got up and followed him. While Jesus was having dinner 
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story of Matthew’s conversion is rendered through a figuratively very detailed 
narrative that mainly relies on two elements: realistic precision in depicting 
the characters, and artistic and anti-naturalistic use of light. The scene is set 
in a place similar to a tavern: a context of trade and ambiguous relations. The 
characters somewhat look alike, so that critics are still unsure as to who of them 
is Matthew. In front of the group, a man with his hand raised clearly addresses 
one of the diners, pointing at him. A beam of warm light enters from one side 
of the room, just on the side of the man he is calling, with the exact purpose 
of illuminating the scene, like a spotlight on the stage of a theater.
The reading of the narrative does not present too many difficulties: the man 
is Jesus, and the raised arm is a performative act that, instead of being told, 
is acted. In The Calling of Saint Matthew, Caravaggio continues the tradition 
begun by Giotto in the cycle of the Scrovegni Chapel, more precisely within the 
cycle of the stories of Jesus that belong to the frescoes of the middle part of the 
Chapel. The gesture of Jesus, who raises his arm, is repeated several times and 
almost always characterized by the same traits, but causes very different things: 
among the doctors, Jesus gives lessons in the temple; he turns water into wine 
at the banquet of the wedding at Cana; he raises Lazarus; he enters Jerusalem 
blessing the crowd; he expells the money changers from the temple, and washes 
the feet of his disciples. Jesus’ hand – which, by the way it is painted by Cara-
vaggio, in addition to citing Giotto also recalls the hand of Adam painted by 
Michelangelo in the Sistine Chapel (1508-1512) – is aimed at a man who the 
artist imagines to be spiritually lost.
Light is the protagonist of the story: it is not coming through the window 
located at the back of the table, as should happen in a naturally lit environment, 
nor does it come from an artificial source. It simply enters the scene from nowhere 
and, following the direction of Jesus’ hand, it emphasizes the power of his action. 
The light makes it so that what really matters (the face of Jesus, his hand, the 
gathering of tax collectors among which is Matteo) emerges from darkness and 
acquires importance by standing out from all that is around, giving the scene 
an effect of powerful dramatization. The Caravaggio painting undoubtedly uses 
some aesthetic properties (the strong mimetic characterization, a particularly 
powerful – and therefore not transparent, but semantically dense – use of color), 
and some other elements that I will call artistic, to distinguish them from the 
purely perceptual or aesthetic ones6. 
at Levi’s house, many tax collectors and sinners were eating with him and his disciples, for there 
were many who followed him. When the teachers of the law who were Pharisees saw him eating 
with the sinners and tax collectors, they asked his disciples: ‘Why does he eat with tax collectors 
and sinners?’ On hearing this, Jesus said to them, ‘It is not the healthy who need a doctor, but 
the sick. I have not come to call the righteous, but sinners’». (Mark, 2 13-17).
6 I adopt here Danto’s distinction between aesthetics and philosophy of art: Danto, The 
Transfiguration of the Commonplace. Contrary to Danto, however, I believe that the aesthetic 
mettere tra parentesi invece che coi due 
punti?
RE_64_seconde_bozze.indd   157 27/04/17   18.20
158
The artistic component presents a particularly interesting conceptual dimension 
and can be detected in some specific parts of the painting: for example, there is 
the particular use of light, which has not only the task to facilitate the interpre-
tation of the painting, bringing out the narrative told in the canvas, but which 
also brings about the symbolism related to light and the relationship between 
light and divine. Then there is Jesus’ hand, which quotes Michelangelo (saying 
something about itself only to those who know a bit of art history) and refers 
to Giotto’s poetic, in which divine power is embodied in Jesus’ agentive power. 
It is undeniable that access to the narrative contained in this painting is 
made possible by Caravaggio’s use of color and light and that, therefore, it 
depends very clearly on our sensitivity. There is cognitio, yes, but it is sensitiva. 
All that Caravaggio means is told using tools that mainly touch the strings of 
sensitivity: sensitive perception is stressed both by the use of color, and by the 
work’s beauty arousing an aesthetic experience in the viewer. Basically, we can 
very well imagine a viewer that knows nothing of the story told by Caravaggio 
and is unable to decipher the symbolism contained in the use of light, or the 
quotations hidden in the hand of Christ. and yet, despite this, we can imagine 
that this observer would easily experience the aesthetic normativity that governs 
the particular way of using the aesthetic properties of light and color.
The judgment of taste on the work of Caravaggio in general, and on this 
painting in particular, is both unique and universal – that is, it belongs to each 
person individually, and yet in another sense it is universal. This judgment, be 
it noted, is strictly aesthetic: it is not about the artistic life of the work which, 
to be understood, requires necessarily the knowledge of the interpreter, and 
which may or may not follow aesthetic cognition. In a word, it can certainly be 
argued that the artistic judgment requires aesthetic cognition, it depends on it, 
and is not itself necessary, in the sense that a basic understanding of the work 
can very well stop at the aesthetic sphere.
4. Contemporary Art: Concept and Normativity
We mentioned that, after Duchamp introduced the ready-made in museums 
alongside the “normal” works of art, the ontological question and the question 
of definition have become urgent. Ready-mades, if they are considered as the 
other works of art, pose an eminently definitional problem, imposing the need 
to answer the following question: “What is a work of art, since an ordinary 
object, specifically an artifact, is treated as a work of art despite the fact that no 
physical property has been added to or subtracted from the object?”
dimension also has in itself a cognitive dimension and therefore can be distinguished from the 
merely perceptive one. The artistic dimension is even more complex and also includes knowledge 
of historical-cultural nature.
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Stated differently, the important caesura determined by contemporary art, 
specifically by the Dada movement and Abstract Expressionism, seems to re-
ally question the idea that the access to the understanding of art is given by 
sensitivity. The whiteness of the urinal, i.e. the properties of the color white, 
was certainly not the reason that prompted Duchamp to present a urinal built 
in series at an art competition. As the artist himself explained, he didn’t expect 
the audience to appreciate the aesthetic qualities of Fountain. Quite the contrary, 
if anything, the opposite was true: Duchamp was interested in the anaesthetic 
dimension, since his goal was to create a work of art prescinding from the use 
of traditional aesthetic properties, first of all beauty.
The realization of ready-mades thus has two fundamental theoretical objectives: 
i) to show the anaesthetic character of art, liberating it from the requirement of 
beauty and ii) to significantly increase the conceptual content embedded in the 
work. Such content is definitely also present in The Calling of St. Matthew by 
Caravaggio; however, it is structured in a more explicit language and in ways that 
are easy to understand if only you have the essential key to the work: the narrative 
of the sacred scriptures. Fountain, on the other hand, is neither beautiful nor ugly: 
rather, it may relate to the category of “disgusting” things – that’s why we think 
that Duchamp exhibited it the way he did (almost upside down, in a position 
that does not evoke the one associated with its ordinary use) to tell us something.
The pursuit of “anaestheticness” is what distinguishes ready-mades from ab-
stractism in which – think, for instance, of the works by Kazimir Severinovič 
Malevič – color is still a determing element (which, in our example, identifies 
the poetic of the Russian artist). In other words, Malevič’s abstract paintings 
are surely closer to The Calling of St. Matthew than Fountain and other ready-
mades, for which, in fact, it does not seem possible to call for any judgment of 
taste and, consequently, there seems to be no aesthetic normativity to which to 
refer. The hypothesis that I intend to verify is that the issue of normativity in 
contemporary arts is subject to a revision of the definition of the very concept 
of art. In other words, it is necessary to reconsider the concept of art if we wish 
to examine the normativity of contemporary art.
4.1. Definition
It is worth noting that the philosophical research of definitions has ancient 
origins and is enlivened by the idea that basic knowledge relies upon concepts 
for which we have identified the necessary and sufficient conditions. Platonic 
dialogues demonstrate this point in a masterly fashion. Socrates’s strategy often 
involves pointing out to the interlocutor how, in spite of their ostentatious con-
fidence, people rarely possess a definition for what they claim to have knowledge 
of (which means, according to the Platonic standard, that they rarely possess 
knowledge). This might seem to be of little importance considering that we are 
able to get by relatively well even by following imprecise notions and cognitions. 
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Everyday life is overflowing with the problems that Plato warned us about. 
If a resurrected Plato were to ask us to define the word “bachelor”, what would 
we respond? Typically, those who are able to recognize a bachelor when they 
see one would respond by saying: “A bachelor is an unmarried adult male”. The 
definition is composed of two concepts: “male” and “unmarried adult”. This 
means, to put it simply, that in order for an individual to be a candidate for 
the definition of “bachelor”, he must possess certain characteristics: he must 
be a male, he must be an adult and, of course, he must not be married. Should 
these conditions not be fulfilled contemporaneously – perhaps because the 
candidate is a woman, a Martian or an adult male who is married – the person 
with whom we are dealing would not be a bachelor. 
In order for the definition of “bachelor” to fulfill its objectives, it is necessary 
to determine the properties shared by all bachelors, after which it is necessary 
to identify the properties that distinguish bachelors from similar classes such as 
that of “husbands”. The philosophy of artworks, in a similar fashion, attempts 
to identify the properties shared by all works of art in order to determine the 
properties that distinguish artworks from classes of similar objects, such as 
artefacts. I have dealt with the question of the definition of contemporary arts 
elsewhere.7 Here it is useful to simply recall the definition I sketched:
A work of art is a social object, an artefact, that embodies a representation, in the 
form of an inscribed trace upon a medium that is not transparent. 
I will call this a “quasi-definition”, which means that it is not a definition 
provided in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions but rather of necessary 
conditions only. This requires some brief clarifications. I will do this by making 
some examples, starting from particular artworks.
Oftentimes, though not always, artists are able to create works whose repre-
sentational content means something for our mind and, at the same time, for 
our emotions. This is the reason for which, as Nietzsche observed, artworks can 
affect our lives more than a well-formulated argument can. Evidence of this 
can be found in Christian Marclay’s The Clock, a film with the impressive dura-
tion of 24 hours. Cinematography has more than a few examples of long (and 
extremely long) films. Nonetheless, The Clock is a true gem of cinematographic 
assemblage in which the separation between reality and the world of fiction 
marks the almost absolute fading of the boundaries of temporality. Time, which 
is measured and indicated with obsessive constancy throughout the entire film, 
coincides with that of our lives in an astonishing way. The spectator realizes this 
immediately – at first with surprise and then by experiencing mounting unease 
combined with authentic enjoyment. Time passes and is measured; it is spoken 
7 Andina 2011. 
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of and considered throughout the whole film, for 24 extraordinary hours. It is 
measured not only by clocks that capture its rhythm, but also by memory that 
travels through Marclay’s excerpts, contextualizes them, and experiences the 
irony of scenes that belong to a black and white past, only to open themselves 
to a world of colours. Across time, the answers to some of the most challenging 
questions are dealt with, some of which, after having been brought up in one 
scene, are answered in a different one, almost in a new temporal dimension. 
The film indirectly proposes a reflection on a classical metaphysical question: 
“what is time?”8. It also shows a possible way to find an answer: by means of 
the relation between time and memory. After all, even public and shared time is 
always marked by individual memory, and this is the first intuition that Marclay 
expresses in his work. Marclay literally shows the passing of time – as its passing 
is the only thing we know about it – and marks it with his own memory, making 
up his work with the films of his personal film library. Time passes for all, it is 
true, and the recording of this fact is certainly a universal fact, at least for humans. 
However, that of The Clock is the very personal time, belonging to its director and 
his memory. The second insight by Marclay is to show how one can face time 
only through its traces: time coincides with its traces. The traces of its passing, of 
its sedimenting in things chosen and things discarded. Therefore Marclay speaks 
of the time through his memory of cinema, which is itself a cinematic work.
Let’s make another example. This is a work of art that is very much tied to 
social and civil commitment at the expense of meta-conceptual mannerism, to 
which Twentieth century art was often inclined. World of Matter is a multime-
dia project providing an open access archive on the global issues of resource 
exploitation and circulation. Quoting the disclaimer of the project: 
World of Matter is an international art and media project investigating primary 
materials (fossil, mineral, agrarian, maritime) and the complex ecologies of which they 
are a part. Initiated by an interdisciplinary group of artists and scholars, the project 
responds to the urgent need for new forms of representation that shift resource-related 
debates from a market driven domain to open platforms for engaged public discourse. The 
project seeks to develop innovative and ethical approaches to the handling of resources, 
while at the same time challenging the very assumption that the planet’s materials are 
inevitably a resource for human consumption […]9.
The programmatic intents of The World of Matter are interesting for several 
reasons: firstly because they are a collective of artists who work at a shared 
goal, a bit as if it were a group of scientists investigating the same theoretical 
hypothesis. Then because the basic idea, clearly spelled out, is that to under-
stand some particularly crucial events of today’s world you have to build a new 
8 Cf. St. Augustine, Confessions, book XV, 14.17.
9 For further details see http://www.worldofmatter.net/about-project.
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representation, that is, a new way to look at that world. The aim is precisely to 
offer people alternative representations of the world in which they live, ones 
that are able to question the more established ones promoted by mass culture. 
This is also the aim of the works by Ursula Biemann, a Swiss artist who tries 
to render through her lens both the psychological and social dinamics of migra-
tion (Sahara Chronicle) and the transgenerational effects of phenomena like the 
exploitation of natural resources and climate change (Deep Weather). Biemann 
deals with video art and, more precisely, with what the artist defines “video essays”. 
To clarify this neologism we might refer to the idea that art, all art, embodies 
meanings. Biemann seems to be convinced of this to the point of comparing her 
production (video) to a category that normally does not refer to art genres but 
scientific works (essay). Deep Weather (2013, video 9’) is a video essay, which is 
different from a video story. The aim is not simply to record facts – which typi-
cally happens with news reports – but to offer a worldview related to the facts 
recorded. This means that the artist is fully aware of the artistic scope of her work 
as well of the aesthetic scope that makes the artistic one even more powerful.
Another interesting element concerns the use of the emotional element, which 
is generally very present in art and which we would expect to be present, even 
more significantly, in works such as those by Biemann, as they address issues with 
a high emotional impact. Yet, the artist decides to make her work unemotional: if 
the mass media tend to underline the emotional aspect of these issues through a 
violent use of images, Biemann presents the problem in eminently critical terms. 
While the emotion is reduced to zero degree, the two video essays are strongly 
characterized in aesthetic terms. They are certainly very beautiful, not only made 
using sophisticated techniques, but endowed with a strong aesthetic element.
Unlike what happened to much Twentieth century avantgarde, for which art 
consisted mainly in researching its own meta-language, today artists focus on 
social and political responsibility as a fundamental element of their production. 
So let’s go back to the definition proposed above:
A work of art is a social object, an artefact, that embodies a representation, in the 
form of an inscribed trace upon a medium that is not transparent 
Works of art are social objects because their creation – even when the artist’s 
intervention on the object is minimal, as in ready-mades – presupposes the 
artist’s intentionality. It is Duchamp’s artistic project that allows Fountain to 
become an artwork, and that project marks the difference between Fountain and 
any other Bedfordshire urinal. In the same way, Biemann’s project marks the 
difference between a skillful shooting of migrants landing made by a reporter 
and Biemann’s video. In all the cases we have examined the artistic project is 
fundamental and involves both the work on art’s own expressive potential – in 
other words, art’s reflection on its being a medium – and the representations 
through which the artist manifests his or her worldview.
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Now, it is evident that the ontological variety of contemporary art implies 
a multiplicity of forms and ways in which the incorporation of the conceptual 
trace takes place: a filmic documentary work has different characteristics and 
therefore different ways and possibilities of incorporating meaning from those 
of other forms of visual art, for example sculpture or painting. Video art, like 
performing art, allows the artist to incorporate the traces of more complex 
and, in some way, more structured narratives. I introduced the idea of con-
ceptual trace, which I prefer to that of concept, because even with the most 
explicit and structured narratives such as Biemann’s works, it is evident that a 
reality shown and told in artistic ways – involving an articulate project and a 
complex narrative – is different from the philosophical reflection on the same 
reality. The trace embodied in artworks is a signifying element that the artists 
inscribes in the work and that viewers complete in their own ways, which can 
be more or less sophisticated and elaborate. The interpretative boundaries, the 
argumentative and logical straucture of the meaning exposed, the use of the 
emotional element: all these things mark a difference between the significant 
trace embodied in artworks and the conceptual structure found in philosophy. 
The latter is what makes use of our superior cognition whereas art, as noted by 
Baumgarten, triggers a cognitio inferior. 
Finally, the medium. The non-transparency of the medium is decisive to 
distinguish artworks from their non-artistic counterparts. If in traditional arts 
(especially in painting, sculpture, literature and architecture) the medium con-
tributes in decisive ways to distinguish the work of art from ordinary objects, 
the greater variety of types of mediums – both material and agentive – used by 
contemporary art often seems to reduce the medium to almost total invisibility, 
while the semantic trace contained in the work acquires a predominant value. 
However, the medium can never be completely transparent: if it were so, we 
would lose the demarcation that distinguishes art from reality and that allows 
art to be. This is a boundary between two different epistemological assets: the 
domain of art admits fiction as a costitutive possibility; reality does not.
By “non-transparency” I mean the idea that the medium must connote the 
fictional space to which the work belongs. Biemann’s video essay is distin-
guished from a documentary, as well as from documentary photography, for 
two basic elements: because it does not intend to render reality objectively and 
because it does not intend to simply document it. In other words, it is not a 
news report. Rather, its aim is a representation that, in Biemann’s case, is as 
realistic as possible: on closer inspection its hyperrealism is used to enhance the 
impact of artistic representation. The story of the migration in Saharan Africa, 
in particular, is not only rendered through very beautiful pictures, but it is also 
“purged” from any emotion.
Migrants themselves lucidly expose their arguments, never pathetically. The 
main consideration is usually along the following lines: “the poverty and misery 
in which we are forced in many countries do not allow us to provide for our 
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families. We cannot just sit and wait. We all have the right to liberty and to 
movement: we must be able to work, get money or, at least, what is necessary 
to us and our families”. Which is to say: you Europeans represent yours as a 
cultural context in which human rights are protected, but let other people 
(non-Europeans) to be deprived of such very rights. And it is beyond doubt 
that the right to survival and movement belong to the category of fundamental 
rights. Is this not an obvious contradiction? And if we are to argue in a different 
direction, what is our definition of right? How do we identify the fundamental 
rights? What reasons allow disregarding the respect of fundamental rights?
To deal with such questions a greater analysis is required, an analytical cog-
nitio intellectiva that involves philosophy and other human sciences, but that 
Biemann’s video makes immediately evident.
4.2. Normativity
How does this all have to do with the issue of normativity of the aesthetic 
judgment? The key point in the case of the judgment of taste is the question 
of its universality, and therefore its normativity. Now, we have seen that, for a 
long time, aesthetic normativity had as a prerequisite the idea of beauty. How-
ever, since artists freed themselves from beauty, the bond between art and the 
universality of the judgment of taste has become problematic. To face the crisis 
of normativity I have therefore proposed a revision of the concept of visual art 
based on three essential points: i) the meaning embedded in the work; ii) its 
being present in the form of trace, rather than in the form of an organized con-
ceptual structure; iii) the non-transparency, i.e. the conceptual and perceptual 
salience, of the medium.
In this restructuring of the concept of art, the traces of meaning and the body 
of the work are fundamental, while the aesthetic properties of the medium are 
secondary. In other words, the work may or may not be beautiful – whatever 
that means – therefore it may or may not exhibit aesthetic properties, but the 
latter are not a necessary condition for its identity. It follows that there is no 
normativity of the judgment of taste that can be applied to contemporary art.
Let me make another observation from the point of view of the history of the 
concept. One of the most successful readings of all events and self-transformations 
that art has imposed on itself in the Twentieth century is the one formulated 
by Arthur Danto, on the basis of what had already been somehow intuited by 
Hegel in The Phenomenology of Spirit, where he foresaw that art’s fate was to be 
resolved in philosophy. In The End of Art,10 Danto argues that the avantgardes, 
which pushed art to revise the limits of its own definition, brought art to reach 
the extreme limit of its possibilities, or rather, of its own development. That’s 
10 Danto 1997.
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why art won’t have a progressive development such as the one reconstructed by 
Vasari,11 but will rather be the expression of single individuals. 
The same conclusion is also found in a work by Sara Fanelli exposed at Tate 
Gallery, London. The 40m long work recreates the timeline of Twentieth cen-
tury art history illustrating it through the names of its most important move-
ments and artists. Significantly, from year 2000 onwards Fanelli reports in her 
timeline only artist names. The history of art, as a history of progress, perhaps 
has come to an end, at least according to what we can see from the historical 
perspective in which we find ourselves. What must be noted is that throughout 
the Twentieth century art has lost its possibility to call for the universality of 
the judgment of taste as well its historical and progressive development. Danto 
suggests not to look at these losses with nostalgia: after all, the counterpart of 
all this is a great gain, that is, the almost absolute liberty that artists have won, 
breaking the canons, cultural traditions and finally freeing themselves even from 
the demands of their patrons.
Our post-historical dimension allows us to draw a conclusion as to the issue 
of normativity. From our historical perspective, we know that the normativity 
of the judgment of taste is not about art, and on the other hand we have also 
reached a more meaningful understanding of the concept of art. We know 
that the visual arts, in their various forms, belong to the domain of sensitive 
cognition and we know that the trace of meaning is of decisive importance to 
a work of art, more than its aesthetic properties. An artwork can be neither 
beautiful nor ugly, but it has to mean something. Great part of our relation 
with an artwork and our ability to interpret it consists precisely in developing 
a meaningful interpretation of the semantic trace, which manifests itself in the 
work in the form of a non-argued for narrative.
In contemporary art, therefore, it no longer makes sense to refer to the nor-
mativity of the aesthetic judgment, while certainly normativity exists for what 
concerns the ways in which the semantic trace is incorporated in the work.
An artwork really works – i.e. it is successful – in all those cases in which the 
significant trace is embodied in appropriate ways so that the viewers can have 
some kind of cognitive response, which can sometimes be also characterized in 
emotional terms. The question posed by the works of contemporary visual art is 
this: does the cognitio sensitiva triggered by the artwork allow me to set in motion 
the process of interpretation? Biemann’s video essays succeed in a very simple and 
direct way, while for people to understand something of the trace of meaning that 
Duchamp incorporated in Fountain, it was necessary that the artist wrote down 
his poetic. Which makes Fountain a less successful work than Deep Weather. It is 
likely that no human being would understand something about Fountain unless 
she has studied it, read about it or met Duchamp in person. On the other hand, 
11 Vasari, tr. Engl. 1998.
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none of this is needed to understand that in Sahara Cronicle there is a question 
on the status of human rights and the policies of their application. 
There is double normativity in Biemann’s video essays: the first regards the 
structure of the medium, the second concerns the structure of the semantic 
trace embodied in the medium. The medium is characterized by two important 
elements: i) its exquisite aesthetic properties, which are achieved by means of 
great technical expertise; ii) the almost total absence of the emotional com-
ponent. The work doesn’t speak to us at the emotional level, and the dyscrasy 
between the narrated horror and the unemotional way in which it is narrated is 
so evident that it has to be the outcome of a specific artistic choice. The com-
bination of these two elements makes it so that the sematic trace of Biemann’s 
work is grasped through an evident communicational short circuit: the tragedy 
is detached from emotions but juxtaposed to the weakness of the normative 
and theoretical framework of Western culture. From this weakness derives a 
staggering ethical and political sloth. 
After all, Biemann adds nothing to the chronicle of migration: she goes 
through it, follows it closely, renders it accessible to the audience in a short time. 
Nevertheless, there is only one way to respond to this artwork, as it demands a 
both universal and individual response: we must question the foundations and 
meaning of Western values and, ultimately, reconsider our idea of humanity.
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